


**TOP SECRET**

25X1



15 November 1961



25X1

Copy No. *ED*



# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1

State Dept. review completed

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000410001-9

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000410001-9

15 November 1961

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

## CONTENTS

25X1

- [REDACTED]
2. Finland: Soviet demand for continued Finnish neutrality appears designed to guarantee President Kekkonen's re-election. (*Page i*)

25X1

- [REDACTED]
4. Yugoslavia: Tito reiterates support for Soviet position on Germany. (*Page ii*)
5. France-Algeria: Rebels apparently reject formal negotiations until hunger strike of Algerian prisoners in France ends. (*Page iii*)

25X1

- [REDACTED]
8. Iran: Shah apparently abandons for time being plan to take personal control of the government. (*Page iv*)

25X1


25X1

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

15 November 1961

### DAILY BRIEF

25X1



\*Finland-USSR: The Soviet demand for assurances of continued Finnish neutrality, together with the implied threat that otherwise Moscow would call for military negotiations, seems designed primarily to guarantee President Kekkonen's re-election and to strengthen pro-Kekkonen supporters in parliament. Kekkonen has dissolved parliament and called for new elections next February in the hope of demonstrating widespread public endorsement for his policies and thereby satisfying the USSR. Kekkonen apparently feels that parliamentary elections in the near future, with the Finnish public in a state of apprehension, will endorse his policy of friendship with the USSR. The recent Soviet moves will also greatly strengthen Kekkonen's own re-election prospects in the presidential election already scheduled for January 1962.

In discussions with Finnish Foreign Minister Karjalainen in Moscow over the week end, Gromyko criticized the political

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000410001-9

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000410001-9

situation in Finland as "unstable" and accused "a certain political grouping" of desiring a change in Finnish foreign policy--an obvious reference to Kekkonen's chief opponent in the presidential election. According to Finnish parliamentary sources, Gromyko also characterized the incumbent minority Agrarian government as too weak to guarantee current Finnish policy, although he did not demand the inclusion of Finnish Communists in a new government. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Yugoslavia: In a speech on 13 November, Tito reiterated his support for the Soviet stand on Germany and complained of Western pressure on Belgrade intended to change his foreign policies. He indicated that both Yugoslavia's and Moscow's policies are intended to prevent creation of a strong, independent Germany which might again threaten their security.

Tito endorsed Moscow's stand on the Soviet-Albanian dispute, but implied that Belgrade does not wish to become

15 Nov 61

DAILY BRIEF

ii

[REDACTED]  
25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000410001-9

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000410001-9

directly involved in this issue. He denied that his country has any expansionist designs on Albania but warned that Yugoslavia must be alert to the possibility of an Albanian provocation which would "trouble peace in the Balkans and cause conflicts to break out." [REDACTED]  
Page 4)

25X1

France-Algeria: There is further evidence that prospects for a negotiated Algerian settlement between Paris and the provisional Algerian government (PAG) are being adversely affected by the rebels' propaganda build-up of vice premier Ben Bella's hunger strike. The PAG cabinet apparently decided on 12 November that formal negotiations could not be scheduled until the hunger strike of Algerian prisoners in France ends. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

15 Nov 61

DAILY BRIEF

iii


[REDACTED]  
25X1



25X1

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000410001-9

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000410001-9



25X1

25X1

Iran: [The Shah apparently has, for the time being, abandoned his plan to take personal control of the government and will permit Prime Minister Amini to continue. Amini has refused the Shah's request that he replace certain cabinet ministers and urged the Shah to permit his government time to carry out its reform program. The Shah agreed and on 11 November made one of his infrequent appearances at a cabinet meeting. Amini outlined his program at this meeting, and the Shah contented himself with a request for more rapid progress in carrying out economic and social reforms.]

[The Shah is likely, however, to intervene in governmental affairs whenever pressure builds up from the interests which oppose reforms but which constitute the Shah's main source of support.]

25X1

25X1

15 Nov 61

DAILY BRIEF

iv

25X1

**Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

# Yugoslav Foreign Policy

In his speech, Tito blamed "certain capitalist circles and other reactionary-minded people" in the US for economic pressures on Yugoslavia "at a time when our country has been severely hit by a drought and when it is in a highly unpleasant situation." He insisted that Yugoslavia would not alter its foreign policies, no matter what the economic consequences, but he gave a rare expression of appreciation for past American aid and asked for its continuation on a credit, rather than grant, basis.

Tito took a fatalistic view of Yugoslavia's relations with the bloc, suggesting that Belgrade expects no change. Ambassador Kennan believes, however, that the Yugoslavs are disturbed because the bloc has not given greater support to Belgrade's current propaganda campaign against West Germany.

Tito expressed at length his preference for East over West Germany, primarily because the Ulbricht regime "shows no revenge-seeking tendencies." Belgrade has been committed to support of the East German regime since extending diplomatic recognition to Ulbricht in 1957 and as a result losing its diplomatic ties with Bonn. [redacted]

[redacted] recently claimed that Yugoslavia would be willing to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany, but only after extracting unspecified concessions from the Ulbricht regime.]

Tito's speech indicated that closer cooperation among the non-aligned states remains the primary goal of Yugoslav foreign policy. The Yugoslav President called upon the uncommitted states to extend their collaboration into the economic sphere and to broaden the membership of the "non-aligned world." Belgrade claims, moreover, that it is having troubles with the Western powers because they are waging a general campaign against the states which participated in the Belgrade conference last September. [redacted]

**Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000410001-9

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000410001-9